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Abstract 
Based on matching techniques in combination with a difference-in-difference estimator, this 
paper estimates the effects at home of initiating production abroad through the establishment of 
a foreign production affiliate. The analysis covers manufacturing and service firms active in 
France during the period 1987-1999. We show that the motivation to start producing abroad is 
an important determinant of its impact at home. Market-seeking FDI in manufacturing is 
associated with significant scale effects, resulting in job creation. By contrast, factor-seeking 
FDI in manufacturing has no significant effect on employment. FDI in the services sector is 
associated with significant positive employment effects, which may reflect the possibility that 
FDI in this sector is predominantly motivated by market access. 
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For years, concerns have repeatedly been expressed about the potential negative employment impact of 
the relocation of production abroad, often referred to as offshoring.  Fears have been heightened further 
by the feeling that service activities, often considered to be relatively skilled, are no longer invulnerable to 
the offshoring phenomenon.  
 
Assessing the real impact of outward foreign direct investment upon domestic employment is difficult, 
because firms that invest abroad differ strongly from the typical firm. Assessing the effects of going global 
on a firm’s domestic activities therefore requires separating out cause and effect. Ideally, the outcomes of 
firms investing abroad for the first time should be compared to their counterfactual outcome had those 
firms not decided to become a multinational. While this counterfactual outcome is unobservable, a 
substitute is to compare foreign investors to firms with ex-ante the same probability to invest abroad, but 
did not do so. This is done here using matching techniques. This involves using all observable information 
available to create statistical twins that only differ in terms of their foreign investment decisions. To take 
account of unobservable differences between our statistical twins, these techniques are combined with a 
difference-in-difference estimator.  
 
As the domestic effects of investing abroad are likely to depend on the motives of firms to go global, we 
propose a simple typology of international investment strategies based on sector affiliation and location 
choice. Our premise is that investment in high-income countries in comparative-advantage sectors reflect 
market-seeking strategies (“horizontal” investments), while the polar case of investment in low-income 
locations by firms in comparative-disadvantage sectors reflects factor-seeking motives (“vertical” 
investments). Hybrid cases are assumed to reflect mixed investment strategies.  
This typology proves useful in identifying the impact of the decision to invest abroad for manufacturing 
firms. Market-seeking investments abroad are found to be associated with a significant positive impact on 
domestic employment in the parent firm, by 16% on average after three years, without a significant impact 
on exports, TFP or the input mix. In contrast, no significant impact is found on employment at home as a 
result of factor-seeking investments. This may suggest that vertical FDI is an efficient strategy to 
withstand competitive pressures. As the typology above is explicitly designed for manufacturing firms, this 
is not used in the case of services. FDI in the services sector is associated with significant positive 
employment effects, which may reflect the possibility that FDI in this sector is predominantly motivated by 
market access. Service FDI is also found to lower capital-labour ratios in the parent firm, perhaps due to 
new management and co-ordination needs arising from production complementarities between the parent 
firm and its affiliate. 
 1.  Introduction  
 
 
In recent decades, concerns have repeatedly been expressed about the potential negative 
employment impact of the relocation of production abroad often referred to as 
offshoring (see Mankiw and Swagel, 2006, for a discussion).  Fears have been 
heightened further by the feeling that services activities, often considered to be 
relatively skilled, are no longer invulnerable to the offshoring phenomenon (Blinder, 
2006). These fears of relocation as expressed in the public debate stand in contrast to the 
empirical evidence.  For example, Aubert and Sillard (2005) for France and Brown and 
Spletzer (2005) for the US find that the employment effects of relocation are rather 
limited. Amiti and Wei (2005) show that while service offshoring may have become 




In order to evaluate the effects of going global on its domestic activities it is imperative 
to separate out cause and effect. Helpman et al. (2004) have shown that the choice 
between investing or not investing for a firm in a certain industry results from a process 
of self-selection. Consequently, comparing firms that invest abroad to the average firm 
that does not do so would be misleading. Ideally, one would like to compare the 
outcome of firms that decided to become multinationals with the counterfactual 
outcome had those firms not decided to become a multinational. This counterfactual 
outcome is unobservable, though. We adopt matching techniques in combination with a 
difference-in-difference (DID) estimator to evaluate the causal effect of establishing a 
foreign affiliate on a set of domestic firm-specific outcomes.  
 
The causal effect of firm’s global engagement strategies has received ample attention in 
the literature on exporting,
2 but so far has received limited attention in the context of 
multinationals. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) use several different endogenous 
treatment approaches to analyse the impact of investing abroad on the domestic 
investment behaviour of Austrian manufacturing firms. Barba Navaretti and Castellani 
                                                 
1 The apparent difference between actual and perceived employment losses due to relocation of 
production may reflect growing worker anxiety that is fed by frequent media reports on mass layoffs. So 
far the empirical evidence suggests that these media reports tend to concentrate on the exception rather 
than the rule. 
2 The main concern is to evaluate whether exporters are more important because of self-selection into 
export market or whereas this reflects learning-by-exporting (see amongst others Clerides et al., 1998; 
Girma et al., 2004)   1
(2003) use propensity score matching to estimate the causal effect of investing abroad 
on the performance of Italian firms, as do Kleinert and Toubal (2007) for Germany. 
Barba Navaretti et al. (2009) for France and Italy, and Debeare et al. (2009) for Korea 
analyse the causal effects of becoming a multinational whilst distinguishing between 
high- and low-income investment locations.
3 
 
In the present paper, we approach the issue of relocation by focusing on the causal 
effects of decisions by firms to globalise their production (i.e. to become multinational) 
on the parent firm at home. For this purpose, we use rich firm-level data for France that 
cover the period 1987-1999. France is an interesting case given the intensity of 
globalisation debate: concerns over “délocalisations" (the French term referring to 
relocation abroad of production units) were according to the Eurobarometer the main 
reason for the no-vote in the referendum on the EU Constitution in 2005.  
 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. First, we do not restrict our 
analysis to manufacturing, but separately analyse the effects of becoming a 
multinational for manufacturing and services firms. The relocation of services activities 
has become more important in recent years and it is sometimes feared that the 
employment consequences in the home country might be even more widespread than in 
the case of manufacturing. Second, we analyse the causal effect of becoming 
multinational whilst differentiating between horizontal, vertical or complex investment 
strategies on the basis of the location of investment (high or low income) and the 
industry affiliation (with comparative advantage or comparative disadvantage) of the 
investing firm.  
 
Our main conclusion is that differentiating between investment strategies is crucial if 
one wants to grasp the effects of outward investment in the home country. In 
manufacturing, market-seeking investment have positive employment effects, whilst 
vertical investments mainly transform the investing firm’s production function. FDI in 
the services sector is also associated with significant positive employment effects, which 
may reflect the possibility that FDI in this sector is predominantly motivated by market 
                                                 
3 A substantial number of papers however has looked at the related but different issue of the effects of 
foreign takeovers on local plants. See for example Arnold and Smarzynska (2009) and Girma and Görg 
(2005).   2
access considerations. These results contradict popular fears about the potential negative 
employment impact of FDI abroad.  
 
2.  Set-Up  
 
Traditionally, the literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) has identified two 
leading motives for establishing an affiliate abroad: the market-seeking (or ‘horizontal’) 
motive and the factor-seeking (or ‘vertical’) motive. Recently, interest has been directed 
to so-called complex FDI strategies, where foreign affiliates may be established because 
of a combination of horizontal and vertical motives, or where multinationals may 
consist of several foreign affiliates, some of which horizontal and others vertical.  
 
Acknowledging these different motives is important in the context of the present paper 
because the impact of foreign direct investment on domestic firm outcomes is likely to 
depend upon the underlying strategy.  
 
•  The impact of FDI on domestic employment is likely to be more negative for 
vertical FDI than for horizontal FDI: whereas “pure” horizontal FDI is only 
intended for production sold on foreign markets, vertical FDI may lead to the 
relocation of all activities that can be produced more cheaply under the host 
country’s factor prices. However, its impact on domestic employment is not 
necessarily negative. The direct negative impact of relocation on employment 
may be offset by positive indirect employment effects associated with relocation 
in the form of: i) production complementarities due to greater co-ordination and 
management needs; ii) scale effects that follow from the impact of relocation on 
average costs.
4   
 
•  The impact of FDI on skill-intensity is expected to be either positive or 
insignificant. Vertical FDI is effectively a form of skill-biased technological 
change in which the production process is geographically fragmented. To the 
extent that low-skilled intensive activities are relocated abroad, this will increase 
                                                 
4 Another reason why vertical FDI usually raises more important social concerns than horizontal FDI is 
that the jobs destroyed as a result of relocation tend to be very different from those created as a result of 
indirect effects.   3
the average skill-intensity for the investing firm at home. However, horizontal 
FDI may also have a positive impact on skill-intensity when relatively skill-
intensive headquarter services are retained at home.  
 
•  The impact of FDI on the productivity of domestic inputs is likely to be 
positive, but especially so for vertical FDI. Horizontal FDI may engender 
productivity improvements through firm-level economies of scale based on 
shared sunk costs (for instance, in R&D), information sharing across affiliates, 
or learning-by-doing.  A priori, more significant productivity gains are expected 
from vertical FDI: the perspective of a deeper division of labour that motivates 
such investments allows the parent firm to specialise in those production 
activities in which it is most efficient.  
 
•  Horizontal FDI is expected to reduce exports as it arises from the trade-off 
between concentrating production in one location and increasing market 
proximity through local production. Vertical FDI is expected to increase exports 
as intermediate inputs are shipped to foreign production sites for further 
processing.    
 
As one cannot observe in the data whether investments are driven by factor-seeking, 
market-seeking or more complex considerations, we posit that the underlying 
investment strategy can be characterised by a combination of industry affiliation and 
location choice: investments by firms from comparative-advantage industries in high-
income locations are assumed to reflect pure horizontal strategies; investments by firms 
from comparative-disadvantage industries in low-income countries are considered to 
follow vertical strategies. All strategies that are not fully consistent with these two 
stylised cases are classified as complex. The resulting typology of foreign investment 
strategies in terms of industry affiliation and location choice is represented in Table 1.  
 
We attempt to evaluate the causal effect of becoming a multinational via each of these 
different foreign investment strategies.
5 In order to allow for the possibility that the 
                                                 
5 As we are only interested in firms that establish a first foreign affiliate, complex forms of foreign direct 
investment necessarily reflect establishments which are likely to be motivated by both horizontal and 
vertical motives. While theoretically the effects of complex forms, as defined here, on observable   4
impact differs according to the location of the newly established affiliate, we extend the 
standard single treatment analysis to a multiple treatment setting (see Section 3 for more 
details on the methodology).
6 It is assumed that each firm can only invest in one 
location at a time so that each firm only receives one single treatment or no treatment at 
all.
7 When the expected outcomes of becoming a multinational further depend on a 
firm’s individual characteristics, treatment effects are said to be ‘heterogeneous’. While 
our methodology takes account of this, it may still be interesting to analyse how the 
average treatment effect changes over different segments of the population: this is done 
here by assessing separately the impact for firms in comparative-advantage and 
comparative-disadvantage industries.  
 
Table 1:  
Matrix of Foreign Investment Strategies  
Location   
High-Income Low-Income 










Comparative Disadvantage  Complex  Vertical 
 
 
3.  Methodology 
 
We borrow from the evaluation literature to evaluate the causal effect of initiating 
production in foreign location j (treatment j) on a range of outcomes relative to that of 








i i i D y y y y
1
0 0 ) (         ( 1 )  
where superscript 0 refers to the case of non-treatment, and  j to treatment j. Dij is a 
dummy equal to one is firm i follows treatment j. The crucial problem in the evaluation 
literature is the missing data problem, i.e. the fact that the outcome of individual i had it 
                                                                                                                                               
outcomes at home simply present a linear combination of the two pure investment strategies, failure to 
disentangle those different forms empirically does not allow one to grasp their implications appropriately. 
6 See Lechner (2001) and Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi (2005) for more details on multiple treatment 
effects. 
7 A few cases are present in our dataset where a firm simultaneously invests in both a rich and a poor 
country. We classify such cases as investors in a high-income location.   5
not been treated, 
0
i y , is unobserved. The main challenge therefore is to construct an 
appropriate counterfactual that can be used instead of 
0
i y . Several methodologies have 
been proposed that attempt to do this. However, none strictly dominates the others. The 
ultimate choice of methodology therefore rests on the specific problem at hand.
8 
 
We adopt matching techniques in combination with a difference-in-difference (DID) 
estimator to evaluate the causal effect of establishing a foreign affiliate on a set of 
domestic outcome variables of interest. Matching is an essentially non-parametric 
method which focuses on the mean difference in outcomes between the treated and the 
untreated over the common support, appropriately weighted by the distribution of 
participants.
9 Matching involves re-constructing the missing data ex-post for the treated 
outcomes had they not been treated when a randomised control group is not available. It 
does so by ‘matching’ firms from the group of untreated firms that are very similar in 
their pre-treatment observable characteristics to the treated. Once matched the only 
observable difference between treated and untreated individuals is their treatment status. 
Using our matched control group, we analyse the average effect of the treatment on the 
treated (ATT): 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 ˆ






ATT D y E D y E D y y E α     ( 2 )
 
 
The matching method relies on two assumptions: the conditional mean independence 
assumption (CIA) and the common support assumption (CS). First, CIA requires that 
conditional on observables the non-treated outcomes are independent of treatment 
status: 
( ) ( ) 1 , 0 ,
0 0 = = = ij i ij i D X y E D X y E  for  S X ∈     (3) 
 
The violation of this assumption results in selection bias, the crux of the evaluation 
problem. Heckman et al. (1997) list three sources of selection bias, that would 
correspond to the following situations, in our case: i) the outcome variables are 
measured differently for treated and untreated, ii) differences arise in average outcomes 
across different markets, and  iii) firms self-select into multinationals on the basis of 
                                                 
8 See Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) for a survey of the alternative approaches to evaluation problems.  
9 Consequently, in contrast to OLS, matching does not rely on assumptions regarding functional form (i.e. 
linearity) and homogenous treatment effects (that the treatment effect is identical across individuals).   6
unobservable characteristics. Consequently, the effectiveness of matching in re-
constructing the unobserved counterfactual depends on three conditions: i) the data used 
to characterise the treated and the untreated come from a single source, ii) treated and 
untreated individuals reside in the same market, iii) the data contain a rich set of 
variables that affect participation and performance. In the present case those three 
conditions are met. Data on firm characteristics all come from a single source.
10 In order 
to satisfy the second requirement, matching is applied sector by sector. Finally, the 
present study uses administrative data for France which contains a wealth of 
information on almost the entire population of firms.   
    
Second, the common support assumption requires that all treated firms have a 
counterpart in the untreated population and all firms have a positive probability of 
investing abroad:  
  ( ) 1 1 0 < = < X D P ij        ( 4 )  
 
We therefore impose this condition in our matching procedure. In practice, there may 
exist a trade-off between both assumptions. While more detailed information allows one 
to construct a ‘better’ counterfactual which is important for justifying the CIA, at the 
same time this may make it more difficult to find appropriate controls thereby 
restricting the common support (i.e. the generality of the results).  
 
In order to implement matching one has to overcome the curse of dimensionality which 
complicates finding an appropriate counterfactual when firms differ along several 
dimensions. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1984) propose to match on the propensity 
score and show that CIA remains valid once this is done appropriately.
11 In our case, 
this score is defined as the propensity to establish an affiliate abroad as a function of 
observable characteristics: 
  ( ) ( ) X D P X y D E ij ij 1 , = =         ( 5 )  
 
                                                 
10 More specifically, the Enquête DREE is used to sort out the treated from the untreated, while the EAE 
is used to analyse why firms decide to establish a foreign affiliate abroad and how this affects their 
performance. See below for details on data sources. 
11 More recently, Hahn (1998) has shown that using the propensity score may also improve the efficiency 
of ATT by reducing the number of dimensions.   7
In what follows, we will use the logit and the multinomial logit models to estimate the 
propensity score for the single and multiple treatment case respectively. Firms are 
matched using nearest neighbour (one-to-one) matching with replacement. Firms are 
matched separately for each year, each two-digit industry, for exporters and non-
exporters. Throughout a condition is imposed that firms cannot be matched to firms 
belonging to the same business group.  
 
We further improve the performance of propensity score matching by combining it with 
the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator following Heckman et al. (1997) and 
Blundell et al. (2004). The CIA is a strong assumption once it is realised that firms base 
their investment decisions on future expected profits, which are unobserved by the 
econometrician. The DID-estimator allows one to control to some extent for selection 
on unobservable characteristics by focusing on the difference in the trend before and 
after treatment instead of that of the difference in levels. The CIA now requires that 
conditional on observables treatment status is independent of unobserved temporary 
individual-specific effects:
12 
( ) ( ) 1 , 0 ,
0 0 = Δ = = Δ ij i ij i D X y E D X y E  for  S X ∈      (3’) 
 
The DID-estimator assumes that unobserved macro-economic developments affect the 
treatment and the control in the same way (‘common trends assumption’). However, 
there may be unobserved differences that cause both groups to react differently in 
response to any observed shocks. We attempt to control for this by including observable 
characteristics that explain the propensity to invest abroad both in levels and first-
differences.  
 
4.  Data sources and descriptive statistics 
 
 
Data on individual firms are obtained from the Enquete Annuelle des Entreprises (EAE) 
which covers all industries and is available for the years 1984-2002. The survey 
comprises all firms with more than 20 employees in manufacturing; in services, it 
includes all firms with more than 30 employees (more than 20 before 1997), as well as a 
                                                 
12 In practical terms, implementing the DID estimator involves estimating a fixed effects model on the 
difference in the means between treated and untreated firms.    8
sample of firms under this threshold.
13 Participation of firms to this survey is 
compulsory by law.  
 
We combine the EAE using the firm identifiers with the survey Direction des Relations 
Economiques Extérieures (DREE, French Ministry of Economics and Finance) which 
documents information on French affiliates abroad. We only use information on the 
year in which a firm establishes its first production establishment abroad, while 
disregarding distribution affiliates. Firms that have according to DREE at least one 
foreign affiliate are classified as multinational firms. Firms that do not have any foreign 
affiliate are considered purely national firms. The main focus here is on firms that 
switch from being national to multinational by establishing an affiliate abroad.  
 
A third dataset with information on business groups, LIFI (Liaisons Financières), is 
used to ensure that we do not match firms that are part of the same enterprise group. 
This is an important issue as it may be quite likely that we link firms within the same 
business groups due to the similarity of their observable characteristics. This, however, 
would give us a misleading picture of the causal effect of becoming a multinational as 
firms within the same business groups have strong financial linkages. As a result, any 
effect due to investing abroad by one firm in a business group may be spread through 
the entire business group, thus mitigating the difference between the treatment firm and 
its control.  
 
In order to follow individual firms through time we organise the data around cohorts. 
Cohorts are defined as six-year windows centred around year t* in which domestic 
firms may establish a foreign presence. We impose the condition that within a six-year 
window the panel is balanced.
14 After having defined the cohorts we stack them 
together in order to create a ‘panel of cohorts’ running from 1987-1999 for 
manufacturing. Bender and Von Wachter (2006) observe that this effectively gives a 
system of seemingly unrelated regressions with cross-equation restrictions. They 
                                                 
13 The sampling method used in services since 1997 is based upon a threshold. This threshold is generally 
set at 30 employees or a turnover of at least 5 million euros. All firms beyond the threshold are 
systematically surveyed each year, while only a sample of other firms below the threshold are surveyed 
each year.  
14 Strictly speaking, a sufficient condition would have been to require the panel to be balanced up to t-
star, the year in which firms switch. However, having a completely balanced panel facilitates the 
interpretation of the results as it removes any effects which are due to changes in the composition of firms 
after t-star. Barba Navaretti et al. (2009) also use a balanced panel but do not define cohorts.    9
suggest that standard errors should be clustered within individuals to take account of the 
resulting correlation in the error structure.
15 
 
Not only do we need to construct an unobserved counterfactual but we also have to 
decide what the counterfactual is supposed to represent, an issue that not usually arises 
in the traditional evaluation literature. In contrast to most policy evaluation programmes 
that are administered at a certain point in time the choice to invest abroad can be taken 
at any point in time and may even be repeated. It is therefore not straightforward 
whether we should compare firms that invest abroad in year t with firms that never 
invest abroad, or with firms that never invest abroad up to year t. Sianesi (2004) argues 
in the context of active labour market programmes in Sweden that the latter gives the 
relevant parameter “for it mirrors the relevant decision open to the job-seeker and the 
program administrator: to join a program at a given time or to wait at a bit longer, in the 
hope of finding a job and in the knowledge that one can always join later” (p. 133). 
Barba Navaretti et al. (2009) focus on the same parameter in their study of foreign 
direct investment. The question addressed is then that of becoming a multinational now 
rather than later instead of that of becoming a multinational now and remaining national 
forever after. This thus addresses the question of becoming a multinational now rather 
than later instead of the question of becoming a multinational now and remaining 
national forever after. We follow this approach in the present paper. 
 
When distinguishing investment by location, we will consider high income OECD 
countries (‘high income’) and the rest of the world (‘low income’). Given the relatively 
high skill level in France, we will identify comparative-advantage industries as those 
with above-average skill intensity. We only apply this distinction to manufacturing, 
though, both because the link between skill intensity and comparative advantage is less 
clear for services than for manufacturing, and because of the more limited number of 
observations for services. In any case, the horizontal-vertical investment typology was 
developed for manufacturing industries and it is unclear to what extent it is suitable to 
characterise foreign investment strategies in services. 
 
Figure 1 reports the total number of “switchers”, i.e. the total number of national firms 
becoming multinationals by initiating production in either a high-income or a low-
                                                 
15 A similar methodology is used in Jacobson et al. (1993) and Hijzen et al. (2009).   10
income location, in our data for each year during the period 1987-1999. First-time 
foreign investments are about equally important in manufacturing and services. In both 
sectors, they are headed predominantly towards high-income countries and follow an 
increasing trend. Our dataset includes a total of 404 switchers in manufacturing and 349 
in services. Due to the requirements that all variables are non-missing for the whole 
time-window [t-2;t+3] the actual estimation sample for the propensity score consists of 
309 switchers in manufacturing and 185 in services.
16  
 


















Note: The figure plots, for each year, the number of firms investing abroad for the first time, respectively 
in a high- and in a low-income location. Firms are classified in manufacturing or services according to the 
activity of the parent firm. 
 
We next assess how the difference in export and FDI status is correlated with different 
firm characteristics by estimating regressions over all firms (with more than 20 
employees in manufacturing, more than 30 in services) on a set of export and 
investment dummies along with additional controls. The first set of regressions only 
includes a set of time dummies (Table 2, Panel A); the second set in addition controls 
for the region and sector of the firm (Panel B); and finally, the third set of regressions 
also includes log employment (Panel C).  
 
                                                 
16 When imposing the common support, not all treated firms have a control on the common support. 
Accordingly, 286 matched firm pairs are studied below in manufacturing and 151 in services.   11
Table 2 shows that exporters are larger and more productive than non-exporters, 
consistent with the theoretical literature following Mélitz (2003). They are also found to 
be more skilled and to own more intangible assets. These differences are large in most 
cases and robust to controlling for sector, region and firm employment. This is also in 
line with previous empirical evidence as presented for instance by Bernard’s et al. 
(2007) for manufacturing firms in the US. We show that this pattern also holds for 
services where exporters are far less numerous.   
 


































Log employment 0.44 1.80 2.05 2.59 0.14 1.14 1.16 1.45
Log value added 0.58 2.10 2.54 3.07 0.75 2.48 2.84 3.22
TFP 0.27 0.66 0.66 0.76 0.22 0.26 0.43 0.48
Average skill 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.35 0.47 0.53 0.60
Exports/turnover 0.18 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.12
Profit / turnover 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02
Intangible assets / VA 1.69 5.29 6.59 6.40 0.75 4.20 4.15 4.33
Corporate taxes 0.55 1.23 2.08 1.28 1.16 3.27 4.65 3.91
Nb. plants 0.05 0.46 0.69 0.93 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
B. Additional controls:  time, region and sector dummies
Log employment 0.38 1.68 1.90 2.40 0.10 1.00 1.09 1.36
Log value added 0.48 1.94 2.27 2.73 0.69 2.25 2.62 2.99
TFP 0.27 0.65 0.62 0.72 0.15 0.23 0.32 0.41
Average skill 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.26 0.40 0.40 0.49
Exports/turnover 0.17 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.11
Profit / turnover 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02
Intangible assets / VA 1.53 4.92 6.13 5.83 0.76 4.03 4.15 4.20
Corporate taxes 0.51 1.19 2.01 1.19 0.95 2.47 4.44 3.22
Nb. plants 0.04 0.43 0.62 0.83 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C. Additional controls: time, region and sector dummies + Log employment
Log value added 0.09 0.19 0.27 0.21 0.33 0.46 0.53 0.70
TFP 0.22 0.44 0.38 0.42 0.15 0.24 0.32 0.42
Average skill 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.29 0.49 0.48 0.60
Exports/turnover 0.15 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.12
Profit / turnover 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 ‐0.02 0.00 ‐0.01
Intangible assets / VA 0.60 0.53 1.31 ‐0.22 0.60 1.76 1.23 1.31
Corporate taxes 0.56 1.38 2.24 1.53 0.41 0.47 2.04 0.91
Nb. plants ‐0.05 0.06 0.18 0.29 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nb. observations 203,639 140 264 4,526 45,678 104 245 2,723 
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients for the dummies on export and investment status in a 
regression that also includes the additional controls described in panel headings A, B and C. Each row 
reflects the results from one regression for manufacturing and one for services. Firms are considered new 
investors the year when they invest abroad for the first time. Multinationals are defined as firms which 
invested abroad at least three years earlier. All results are significant at the 1 percent level, except those 
italicized. All enterprises with more than 20 employees are covered in manufacturing (277,350 
observations in total or 21,335 per year on average), all enterprises with more than 30 employees are 
covered in services (312,822 observations in total or 24,063 per year on average).  
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Table 2 also confirms that foreign investors differ strikingly from mere exporters, 
consistent with Helpman et al. (2004). This is true in all the above-cited dimensions. In 
addition, new investors display intermediate characteristics between multinationals
17 
and simple exporters in almost all cases (in particular employment, value added and 
productivity), with firms investing in high-income locations more closely resembling 
multinationals than those investing in low-income countries. For instance, controlling 
for time, sector and region, exporters without foreign affiliate employ 47% more 
workers than non-exporters in manufacturing (exp(0.38)-1), while the differential is 
436% and 569% for first-time investors respectively in low- and high-income locations, 
and 1008% for multinationals (still with respect to domestic non-exporters). This 
confirms the need to control for the ex-ante specificities of new foreign investors, as 
well as the interest of distinguishing investors to low- and high-income locations.  
 
 
5.  Constructing the Counterfactual  
 
The propensity scores are estimated based on a multinational logit model of the 
propensity of a domestic firm to establish an affiliate abroad. Before going on to the 
estimations, one has to decide on the appropriate number of lags. Most studies looking 
at either the decision to export or invest abroad use explanatory variables in the last year 
before investment takes place (or before one starts exporting). This approach may be 
unsatisfactory when the decision to invest is taken one or two years before the 
investment takes place and when the decision to invest is taken in conjunction with 
other decisions that affect the observable characteristics of the firm. In this case, part of 
the causal effect due to the decision to invest abroad may actually occur before the year 
of the investment.
18 We prefer the specification with two lags as it allows for some 
anticipatory effects, but does not restrict our ability by too much to follow matched 
firms after investing abroad.  
 
Table 4 reports the results obtained from the multinomial logit regressions for 
manufacturing and services respectively. The propensity of domestic firms to become 
multinational is considered to be a function of the log of employment, log exports over 
value-added, total factor productivity (TFP), profits over value-added, the log wage bill 
                                                 
17 The definition of multinationals is restricted here to firms having invested abroad at least three years 
before. 
18 In a manner similar to the Ashenfelter dip in the labour economics literature.   13
per worker, log intangible assets over value-added, log corporate taxes over turnover, 
the log number of production plants (in manufacturing only), the log change in value-
added, the change in profits over value-added. The regressions also include a full set of 
region, sector and time dummies. 
 
The propensity of firms to establish a foreign presence abroad is consistently found to 
depend upon the parent’s scale, whether measured through either value added or 
employment. Although the corresponding coefficients are not always significant, the 
propensity to invest abroad also depends positively on the level of exports, TFP, 
intangible assets, and corporate taxes. These results are in line with the descriptive 
statistics above and the theoretical predictions in Helpman et al. (2004).  
 
Table 4:  
Propensity to Switch  
All RICH POOR All RICH POOR
Ln VA t*-2 3.04 *** 2.56     3.51 *** 1.06     2.77 **  -0.23    
(2.66)     (1.60)     (2.66)     (1.51)     (2.49)     (-0.23)    
Squared ln VA t*-2 -0.13 *** -0.13 **  -0.11 *   -0.05 *   -0.11 **  -0.03    
(-2.68)     (-2.06)     (-1.94)     (-1.77)     (-2.44)     (-0.66)    
Ln Employment t*-2 0.52     1.12 **  -0.18     0.82 **  0.52     1.48 *  
(1.08)     (2.05)     (-0.32)     (2.48)     (1.59)     (1.89)    
Ln Exports t*-2 0.10 *** 0.12 *** 0.07 **  0.02 **  0.01     0.04 ***
(4.12)     (3.51)     (2.09)     (2.06)     (0.97)     (2.61)    
TFPt*-2 0.40 **  0.43 **  0.45     0.43     0.20     1.07    
(2.23)     (2.08)     (1.55)     (1.26)     (0.58)     (1.41)    
Ln Average Wage t*-2 -0.46     0.34     -1.59 **  1.03 *** 0.76 **  1.41 ** 
(-0.88)     (0.55)     (-2.21)     (3.55)     (2.17)     (2.54)    
Profits t*-2 1.16     4.19 **  -3.36 *   -0.41     -0.70     0.11    
(0.72)     (2.32)     (-1.82)     (-0.63)     (-0.97)     (0.08)    
Ln Intangible Assets t*-2 0.05 *** 0.07 *** 0.02     0.03     0.01     0.06    
(3.15)     (3.37)     (0.69)     (1.15)     (0.29)     (1.58)    
Ln Corporate Taxes t*-2 0.03 **  0.02     0.05 *   0.03 **  0.03 **  0.01    
(2.20)     (1.32)     (1.93)     (2.15)     (2.19)     (0.60)    
Δ ln Value added t*-2  0.40     0.53     0.13     1.53 *** 1.19 **  1.61 ***
(1.07)     (1.21)     (0.23)     (3.93)     (2.55)     (2.71)    
Δ Profits t*-2 -0.57     0.40     -2.37     -3.63 *** -4.19 *** -1.58    
(-0.26)     (0.16)     (-0.98)     (-5.31)     (-6.52)     (-0.88)    
Ln No. of plants t*-2 0.24 *** 0.32 *** 0.08    
(2.93)     (3.26)     (0.61)                         
Observations 89,584     36,527
Manufacturing Services
89,584 37,961  
Note: *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and  1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
regressions include full set of industry, region and time dummies. Columns “All” report the results of a 
simple logit model, while columns “Rich” and “Poor” jointly report the results of a multinomial logit 
model. 
 
The average wage is of particular relevance in the present paper as it is used to define 
comparative advantage and comparative disadvantage industries. This variable   14
measures differences across firms in the average wage bill per employee. As such 
differences are more likely to result from differences in the composition of the 
workforce than pay differences across firms for similar workers we interpret this 
variable as a measure of skill-intensity. The results indicate that the impact of skill 
depends on the sector of the parent and the location of investment. In manufacturing, the 
average wage is associated with a positive albeit insignificant coefficient for the 
propensity to invest in rich countries and a negative and significant coefficient for the 
propensity to invest in poor countries. This is consistent with our priors discussed in 
Section 2 about pure investment strategies: French firms in comparative-advantage 
industries tend to invest in high-income countries (horizontal FDI), while those in 
comparative-disadvantage industries are more likely to carry out investments in low-
income countries (vertical FDI).  
 
In services, by contrast, the average wage is estimated to have a positive and significant 
impact on the propensity to invest abroad whatever the location. In this respect, FDI in 
services behaves in a way similar to horizontal FDI in manufacturing, presumably 
reflecting the important role of market-access considerations in driving service 
investments abroad.  
 
The propensity scores are used to construct the unobserved counterfactual, i.e. to match 
switching firms to non-switching domestic firms which are similar in terms of their 
observable characteristics. While treated firms differ significantly and substantially 
from other firms in most respects, the balancing tests reported in Appendix Table 1 
show that the matching procedure satisfactorily removes these differences. 
 
 
6.  Results 
 
Using the matched sample we now analyse the causal effect of initiating production 
abroad. Rather than analysing the differences in the means between the treated and the 
controls at arbitrary points in time, we use our dataset of stacked cohorts to track 
average differences over time. We first consider the impact of different FDI strategies 
on parent exports, then discuss its implications for parent employment and close with an 
analysis of FDI on technology.  
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6.1 International investment strategies and firm-level exports 
 
As emphasised above, differences in investment motives can be a useful guide to 
interpret the employment effects of investment projects. Absent the possibility to ask 
firms about their motives, we argued in Section 2 that the combination of industry 
affiliation (comparative advantage versus comparative disadvantage) and income 
location choice (high income versus low income) allows obtaining a simple 
characterisation of different FDI strategies. Given the widely different implications of 
horizontal and vertical FDI for exports, the estimated causal effects of FDI on exports 
provide a rough test of the appropriateness of this characterisation.  
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Notes: Relative time is zero for the year when foreign investment takes place. The dependent 
variable is the change from t-2 in the difference in the log of exports between first-time investors 
and the matched control group. The red line represents the average impact; the shaded area 
corresponds to the associated 95% confidence interval, based on bootstrapped standard errors, 
clustered on individual firms (100 replications).  
 
The estimates reported in Figure 2 lend support to the typology proposed above: FDI in 
low-income countries by manufacturing firms in comparative-disadvantage sectors are 
associated with strongly increased exports (ceteris paribus, their level is multiplied by 
almost nine with respect to the control group), consistently with the assumption that   16
such situations reflect vertical, or factor-seeking, FDI. In contrast, investments in high-
income locations by firms in comparative-advantage sectors are not associated with a 
statistically significant effect on exports, consistent with the prior that they are 
horizontal, market-seeking investments. The intermediate results found for the 
remaining two cases also support the idea that they reflect complex motives, mixing 
factor- and market-seeking strategies.  
 
Our typology does not apply to service firms. The estimated export effects of initiating 
production abroad is positive for service firms, whatever the location, although 
somewhat imprecise. These results could reflect the existence of a division of labour 
between the parent firm and its affiliate, but also the existence of production 
complementarities, which are likely in particular for business services.  
 
 
6.2 International investment strategies and firm-level employment  
 
The results confirm the prior that horizontal FDIs are the most beneficial in terms of 
employment in the parent firm (Figure 3). For a firm in a comparative-advantage 
industry that invests in a high-income location, employment is 16% higher three years 
after investment relative to its counterfactual outcome that would have emerged had it 
not invested abroad and it is increasing over time. In contrast, vertical FDI associated 
with firms in comparative disadvantage industries that invest in low-income locations, 
does not have a statistically significant effect on employment which, if anything, 
appears to decrease over time.  Complex FDI exhibits intermediate results, positive but 
only significant in the case of firms in comparative-advantage industries investing in 
low-income countries.  
 
For services FDI, a large and significant positive impact is found in the context of 
investments in high-income locations (+17% three years after investment, significant at 
the 1% level), comparable to the effect found for horizontal investments in 
manufacturing. Investments in low-income location are found to have a small positive, 
but insignificant impact on employment.  
   17
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Notes: Relative time is zero for the year when foreign investment takes place. The dependent 
variable is the change from t-2 in the difference in the log of exports between first-time investors 
and the matched control group. The red line represents the average impact; the shaded area 
corresponds to the associated 95% confidence interval, based on bootstrapped standard errors, 
clustered on individual firms (100 replications). 
 
Remarkably, among the various configurations studied, no sign could be found of any 
negative effect on the parent firm’s employment. As a robustness check, the 
employment impact was carried out adding the log wage as an additional control. These 
semi-parametric estimates were very close to the one presented above (see Appendix 
Table 2). 
 
6.3 International investment strategies, the input mix and efficiency 
 
Figure 4 represents the trajectories of the capital-labour ratio relative to our re-
constructed counterfactual by location and type of industry. For horizontal FDI the 
estimated impact is negative, but not statistically significant. In principle, this could 
reflect the role of production complementarities associated with such investments in the 
form of greater co-ordination and management needs. Such production 
complementarities may be particularly important for services investment abroad. By 
contrast, vertical FDI is found to increase the capital-labour ratio. While these estimates   18
are only significant at the 10% level, they are consistent with vertical FDI allowing 
further division of labour across affiliates, with the parent firm retaining the most 
capital-intensive parts of the production process. A qualitatively similar pattern is 
obtained when replacing the average wage, a rough measure of skill-intensity, instead of 
the capital-labour ratio (with no change for horizontal FDI and a slight increase for 
vertical FDI). These results are reported in Figure 1 of the Appendix.  
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Notes: As in Figure 2. The dependent variable is the capital-labour ratio, computed as fixed 
assets per employee.  
 
Figure 5 reports the estimated effects of FDI on total factor productivity (TFP) by 
international investment strategy. The efficiency gains associated with vertical FDI 
could be potentially large, but lack precision. Nevertheless, they are fully consistent 
with the idea that the division of labour across affiliates is a source of efficiency gains.  
There is no indication that similar efficiency gains may also arise for horizontal FDI. 
For complex FDI, statistically significant efficiency gains are found for firms in 
comparative-disadvantage sectors investing in high-income locations, perhaps as a 
result of outsourcing those fragments of the production process in which they were least 
efficient. No such effect is found for firms in comparative-advantage sectors investing 
in low-income locations or for services firms.    19
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Notes: As in Figure 2. See Appendix 1 for details on TFP measurement.  
 
As a robustness check, semi-parametric estimates are carried out for TFP, adding firm 
turnover as an additional control (see Appendix Table 3). Although qualitatively 
comparable to the results presented in Figure 5, the estimated TFP impacts are 
systematically lower due to the positive impact of FDI on turnover. This suggests that 
part of the efficiency gains mentioned could reflect economies of scale that arise from 
greater specialisation.  
 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
While anecdotal evidence of jobs displacement abounds, our systematic analysis of 
French manufacturing and services investment abroad over the period 1987-1999 shows 
that initiating production abroad is not detrimental to the parent firm’s domestic 
employment. This confirms previous results in the literature, in particular those found 
by Barba-Navaretti et al. (2009) for French manufacturing firms.  
   20
The first key contribution of our analysis is to show that the consequences of initiating 
production abroad for parent firms in manufacturing depend on the investment 
underlying strategy, which, in turn, can be related to the sector of origin and the income 
level of the recipient country.  
 
•  Investments in high-income countries by manufacturing firms in comparative-
advantage sectors mainly reflect horizontal, market-seeking motives. They have 
a significant positive impact on domestic employment in the parent firm 
compared to the counterfactual outcome of not investing abroad. No discernible 
impact is found on exports, TFP or the input mix, consistent with the prior that 
this type of investment does not significantly change the way the production 
process is organised in the parent firm.  
 
•  Investments in low-income countries by manufacturing firms in comparative-
disadvantage sectors reflect vertical, factor-seeking motives. Vertical investment 
strategies pave the way for an international division of labour across the firm’s 
production units. This has a strong positive impact on parent exports, and not 
surprisingly, has important implications for the way the production process is 
organised in the parent firm. Vertical FDI increases the capital-labour ratio (and 
possibly skill-intensity) and may also yield positive efficiency gains. However, 
in contrast to conventional wisdom, they do not translate into job losses in the 
parent firm. If anything, a positive impact is found on employment in the 
investing firm (these estimates are not statistically significant). On the whole, 
vertical FDI appears to be an efficient strategy to withstand competitive 
pressures. Despite relocating part of the production process abroad, employment 
gains are being registered on the segments that are retained at home.  
 
•  We classify as complex those FDIs that do not correspond to any of those two 
polar cases, and the results found in these cases are indeed a mix of those 
obtained for the pure strategies.  
 
The second main contribution of this paper is to extend the analysis to the services 
sector. This is important for two reasons. First, FDI in services is very important. In the 
most recent year of our sample, the number of first-time investors abroad in the services   21
sector exceeded that in manufacturing. Second, our understanding of the growing 
internationalisation of the services sector is still very limited. The manufacturing-based 
typology referred to above cannot be straightforwardly applied to services. We find that 
service FDI is associated with strongly increased employment in the parent firm, by 
almost 20% (the same order of magnitude as that for horizontal FDI by manufacturing 
firms). Services FDI also appears to lead to lower capital-labour ratios in the parent 
firm. This may reflect the role of production complementarities between the parent firm 
and its affiliates, arising from new management and co-ordination needs. As for vertical 
FDI in manufacturing, services FDI is associated with a strong positive impact on the 
parent exports. 
 
The present firm-level analysis allows one to provide a detailed picture of the effects of 
initiating production abroad in the parent firm after controlling for a rich set of observed 
and unobserved characteristics. However, such an analysis is also necessarily partial in 
nature as it does account for potentially important general equilibrium effects. Another 
limitation worth recalling is that we focus on firms investing abroad for the first time. 
This is useful from an empirical perspective as it improves the identification of the 
impact of FDI.
19 However, it may also affect the generality of our results, particularly 
when the impact of first-time investment on the parent firm is very different from that of 
foreign investments by MNEs. If anything, we would expect the effects of investment 
abroad by MNEs to be smaller than those observed for first-time investors as 
subsequent investments may be expected to have less radical implications for the 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
A Measuring TFP 
 
In order to measure Total Factor Productivity (TFP) we apply the mean value theorem 
as suggested by Klette (1999). In practice this means that we transform the data in 
differences from the industry median within each year.  There are two advantages to this 
transformation: i) it increases the flexibility to deal with firm heterogeneity within the 
industry; ii) it removes the need to use industry level price deflators which are difficult 
to obtain for services. After transforming the data we estimate TFP as the residual of a 
Cobb-Douglas production function of capital, labour and materials. The production 
function controls for the possible correlation between input-choice and time-invariant 
productivity shocks by including individual specific fixed effects.  
 
 
B Data Management  
 
In order to follow individual firms through time we organise the data around cohorts. 
Cohorts are defined as six-year windows around year t [t-2; t+3] in which domestic 
firms establish a foreign presence. We impose the condition that within a six-year 
window the panel should be balanced. After having defined the cohorts we stack them 
together in order to create a ‘panel of cohorts’ running from 1988-1998 for 
manufacturing. Bender and Von Wachter (2006) observe that this effectively gives a 
system of seemingly unrelated regressions with cross-equation restrictions.  
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APPENDIX 2: Additional results 
 
Appendix Table 1:  
Balancing Tests for Multiple Treatment Matching  
       Unmatched          Matched
p < 0.1 p < 0.05 p < 0.1 p < 0.05
Manufacturing    (out of 176 comparisons)
Investors to high‐income locations 126 120 15 8
Investors to low‐income locations 106 95 17 9
All 133 127 7 5
Services   (out of 190 comparisons)
Investors to high‐income locations 116 106 16 6
Investors to low‐income locations 65 57 8 1
All 121 110 15 9  
Note: The table shows the number of cases where the p-value of a t-test for equality of means between 
treated and non-treated firms is smaller than the indicated significance level. The comparison is carried 
out for each variable used in estimating the propensity scores (except squared log VA, i.e. 11 variables in 
manufacturing, 10 in services), separately for each sector (16 in manufacturing, 19 in services), hence 11 
x 16 = 176 comparisons in manufacturing, 10 x 19 = 190 in services.  
 
 
Appendix Table 2: Semi-parametric estimates of the impact of FDI on employment 
 
Log Employment
t-1 0.02 *   0.04     0.02     0.01     0.02     -0.02    
(1.91)     (1.56)     (0.91)     (0.67)     (0.88)     (-0.49)    
t0 . 0 5 *   0.06     0.04     0.08 **  0.06     -0.02    
(1.85)     (1.39)     (1.27)     (2.27)     (1.54)     (-0.46)    
t+1 0.07 **  0.07     0.04     0.04     0.09 **  0.02    
(2.10)     (1.45)     (1.21)     (0.58)     (2.02)     (0.34)    
t+2 0.12 *** 0.13 **  0.04     0.04     0.13 **  0.04    
(3.02)     (2.05)     (1.06)     (0.73)     (2.42)     (0.61)    
t+3 0.16 *** 0.17 **  0.05     0.05     0.17 *** 0.04    
(3.53)     (2.03)     (1.15)     (0.68)     (2.90)     (0.47)    
Log wage *** *** ***
           
Observations 1,248 540 1,008 636 1,260 552































Note: The dependant variable is the change in the difference between switchers (i.e., first-time foreign 
investors) and the matched control group, based on means relative to the year for which the firms have 
been matched (t-2, where t refers to the year of investment). Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicate statistically significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Standard errors are clustered around 
individual firms. All regressions include a constant, dummies for relative time and log average monthly 
wage (measured at the firm-level).   
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Appendix Table 3: Semi-parametric estimates of the impact of FDI on TFP 
Total Factor Productivity
t-1 -0.03     0.00     0.02     0.02     0.02     -0.02    
(-1.24)     (-0.01)     (1.03)     (0.77)     (0.60)     (-0.49)    
t -0.05     -0.05     0.02     -0.02     0.07     0.012    
(-1.53)     (-1.28)     (0.66)     (-0.86)     (1.61)     (0.22)    
t+1 -0.02     -0.05     0.03     0.04     0.10 **  -0.02    
(-0.64)     (-1.01)     (0.91)     (0.68)     (2.11)     (-0.29)    
t+2 -0.07 **  -0.08     0.05     0.05     0.06     0.01    
(-2.08)     (-1.38)     (1.22)     (0.74)     (1.27)     (0.14)    
t+3 -0.07 *   -0.06     0.05     0.02     0.01     0.04    
(-1.69)     (-1.14)     (1.24)     (0.30)     (0.27)     (0.52)    
Log turnover *** *** ***
       
Observations 1,248 540 1,008 636 1,236 552





























Note: The dependant variable is the change in the difference between switchers (i.e., first-time foreign 
investors) and the matched control group, based on means relative to the year for which the firms have 
been matched (t-2, where t refers to the year of investment). Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicate statistically significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Standard errors are clustered around 
individual firms. All regressions include a constant, dummies for relative time and log turnover.   
 
Appendix Figure 1: Impact of Foreign Investment on Skill-Intensity, by Income-Level of the 
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Notes: As in Figure 2. Average labour skill is measured as the average yearly wage in the firm.  